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In 1998 the volume of U.S. private spending rose by almost twice the increase in disposable
income. The impact of this excess private spending financed by increased net borrowing
has been profound; without it, the economy would have stagnated. Can this pattern of
demand growth continue? The answer is a resounding no. 
President Bill Clinton was not alone in late 1997 when he characterized the economic turmoil in Asia as "a
few small glitches in the road." Expert opinion was then pretty well united in the belief that the region's
problems would not amount to much. Now, faced with Asia's unfolding calamities, the experts know better. 
Clinton's gung-ho optimism was not wholly misplaced. Although much of Asia sank, the American economy
enjoyed another year of robust expansion; its growth rate in excess of 31/2 percent was substantially faster than
expected a year ago. Consumer spending and investment roared ahead, more than making up for the collapse
in exports. And thanks to the American locomotive, the world outside Asia and Japan enjoyed a rate of
growth-around 3 percent-that compared favorably with the lowly 2 percent or so annual average achieved
earlier this decade. 
The key question is whether all this can last. Can the United States sustain its strong rate of spending, thereby
propping up a troubled world? If the United States slows its spending, the world will need to look to Europe
and Japan to take up the slack, a role they would be unable fill given the current state of their economies. 
A candid statement about prospects for the American economy in 1999 is "We don't know." History is replete
with examples of booms that continue for longer than anyone expects or that reverse into recession just as
unpredictably, and short-term forecasters at the moment have produced a wide range of predictions. However,
in concentrating so much on the short term, commentators often miss the strategic perspective. Looking ahead
to the next few years, it seems to us wholly improbable that the United States can continue to act as the world's
spender of last resort. Indeed, if present policies continue, the medium-term outlook for American activity
appears exceedingly bleak. 
One reason is capacity. The United States's long recovery from its early 1990s recession has not been built on
a miracle of technological advance but on a substantial reduction in unemployment. Thus, the current rate of
growth can continue only as long as slack remains in the labor market. Even allowing for efficiency
improvements, it is unlikely that the United States can sustain a medium-term growth rate much in excess of 2
percent without running into supply constraints that could be inflationary or cause an even more severe
balance of payments deficit. 
But even more important than capacity is the question of demand. In the face of a bigger budget surplus and a
worsening trade performance, American demand has been kept alive by a burst of spending by households and
companies well in excess of the advance in after-tax incomes. An unprecedentedly large and growing gap
between private spending and income now exists, and that gap has been financed primarily by an increase in
borrowing. In 1998 the volume of private spending rose by about 6 percent, almost twice the increase in
disposable income. The impact of this excess private spending financed by increased net borrowing has been
profound; without it, the economy would have stagnated. 
Can this pattern of demand growth continue? The answer is a resounding no. Without a fiscal boost, private
spending would need to continue to rise faster than private income to offset the drag on activity arising fromlong-established adverse trends in U.S. trade performance. The result would be a fabulous increase in
indebtedness, both domestic and overseas. 
In a report shortly to be published by The Jerome Levy
Economics Institute, we shall illustrate the dimensions of the
problem. The accompanying chart is a preview showing
what we think would have to happen to keep the economy
ticking along at about a 2 percent rate of growth. The results
are outlandish. According to our calculations, private
spending would eventually have to exceed income by an
amount double the unprecedented 1998 level and equivalent
to over 8 percent of the gross domestic product. The flow of
net lending to the private sector would have to rise higher
than ever before to over 20 percent of disposable income,
and external net debt would rise to over 30 percent of GDP,
thanks to a large and widening trade gap. These calculations
have to be only very roughly right to be truly worrying. 
Because a process that is accelerating is intrinsically
unsustainable, the present pattern of American growth
cannot continue. At some stage, private sector spending will
subside to a rate at best equal to, and more probably below,
private sector income. In turn, production and incomes
would also subside, as would overseas activity (hit by lower
sales to the United States), thus curbing overseas demand for
American exports. If it had not already done so, the stock
market bubble responsible for much of today's spending
buoyancy would burst, amplifying the deflation. 
Britain's experience before and after the late 1980s boom
offers a parallel. Spurred by explosive housing prices and
financial deregulation, Britain's private sector overspent its
income by as much as 6 percent of GDP at the peak of the
boom. Nemesis came during the next three years as a
complete reversal in private saving behavior and a deep and brutal recession. But even if we assume in the case
of the United States a much less marked reversion in saving behavior, we find that the shock could potentially
wipe out economic growth on average over the next five years. Unemployment would soar. 
The collateral damage to the rest of the world would be severe. Worst affected would be those economies
heavily reliant on exports to the United States. Prime casualties would be Canada, Asia, and Latin America.
According to our calculations, the damage to the medium-term growth outlook in these regions caused by
more normal U.S. saving behavior would be on a par with the potential damage experienced by the United
States itself. In addition, escalating trade deficits would make Latin America highly vulnerable to the sort of
capital flight that devastated Asian economies this year. 
Thanks to their much lower exposure, Europe and Japan would suffer least from an American stagnation.
However, a further shock to a depressed Japan hardly bears contemplation, and with mass unemployment
continuing in much of Europe, the large adjustments in the balance of payments brought about by American
retrenchment would risk rekindling trade disputes. 
But surely none of this could happen? Would not economic policy respond with vigor to the potential
deflation and substantially cushion the blow? Our answer is yes in some ways and possibly no in others. Yes,
interest rates would be brought down swiftly, but in the advanced world there is not that much room for
maneuver. Nominal interest rates might have to fall to zero (they can go no lower) simply to match falling price
expectations, that is, to prevent monetary policy's becoming tighter. If so, there would be no scope to offset the
deflation by monetary means. 
The spotlight is therefore turned on fiscal policy. Fiscal expansion would be a more promising option, but it
cannot be undertaken by the United States alone. If the United States merely replaced deficient private demand
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Accounts with extra public demand, the economy would run ever larger current account deficits and escalate its external
indebtedness. The only plausible solution would be coordinated fiscal pump priming in Europe and the United
States-and more in the former than in the latter. 
And how likely is that? Bill Clinton is savoring the budget surplus while center-to-left European governments
face the institutional and intellectual hurdles enshrined in the arbitrary new rules that will determine the fiscal
policy of members of the new single currency area. Alas, without a radical rethink by policymakers of their
aversion to fiscal policy, the world may face not simply "a few small glitches in the road," but a road disfigured
by ruts and potholes, if not an occasional abyss. 
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